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A generation of scholars has argued that nationalism was solely a product of the 
West, most importantly Europe. The Bengali Nobel Laureate in Literature 
Rabindranath Tagore (1917), for example, stated that his homeland, India, never had 
nationalism prior to British colonialism. A large reason for this is the landmark 
publication of Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism (1983), in which he argues 
that nationalism is essentially a political principle required by societies as they 
undergo the inevitable transformation from pre-modern agrarianism to modernity, 
industrialization, and secularization. Gellner argues that this process is necessary for 
homogenizing cultural forms that mirror the division of labor in modern western 
nation states, thus creating a so-called “high culture” that is distinct and separate from 
traditional forms of culture practiced by the peasantry. Along with this tendency to 
modernize culture, religion is also given a back seat to allow for the emergence of a 
cosmopolitan form of secularism.  Moreover, Gellner, suggests that nationalism and 
modernity spread from Europe to other parts of the world as a result of colonialism.  
Benedict Anderson, in Imagined Communities (1991), essentially agrees with 
Gellner on the secular European origins of nationalism, but instead of envisioning it as 
a singular, totalizing phenomenon, he prefers to see it as a discourse fabricated by the 
ruling class to create an imagined “national” community that transcends linguistic, 
ethnic, religious, and racial diversity. While agreeing with both Gellner and Anderson’s 
models as promoting a profoundly modular character of cultural homogeneity imposed 
on the emerging nation, Partha Chatterjee (1993: 21) significantly points out that in 
the case of India, no singular version of nationalism ever existed. As such, those 
models created for the study of nationalism in the West might not be appropriate for 
                                                   
1 An earlier version of this paper titled “Religious Nationalism: India and Serbia  
Compared was read as the keynote address at the Religion and Nation(alism): En- 
tanglements, Tensions, Conflicts conference held in Tartu, Estonia, November 2016.
A much shorter, significantly different version is to appear soon in a volume dedi- 
cated to Dan Ben-Amos. I also wish to thank the anonymous readers for their use- 
ful comments that led to the final revisions incorporated into this paper. 
 
『年報人類学研究』第 9 号（2019） 
Annual Papers of the Anthropological Institute Vol.9 (2019) 
88 
 
countries in South Asia, where totally different systems of beliefs and practices led to 
the formulation of completely different and distinct ideologies that transcended such 
principles as caste, class, and gender in the past and continue to do so in the present. 
Such ideologies that demand loyalty do not have the capacity to create a unified 
culture, primarily in places like India, where there is an incredible amount of diversity 
with which to contend (Sarkar 2016).  
Peter van der Veer follows Chatterjee’s intervention in his important book titled 
Religious Nationalism (1994), where he asks us to bear in mind that, “the centralizing 
force of nation building itself sprouts centrifugal forces that crystallize around other 
dreams of nationhood: nationalism creates other nationalisms—religious, ethnic, 
linguistic, secular—but not common culture” (14-15). He goes on to build upon 
Chatterjee’s discursive strategy to investigate how colonial nationalism engaged with 
Indian traditions on the ground to create a variety of emergent strands of thinking 
that I have elsewhere termed “vernacular nationalism” (Korom 2006, 2010). Van der 
Veer essentially opens up the analytical field to search for nationalisms that are not 
essentially secular, so, while South Asia might not have had “secular” nationalism, per 
se, it most certainly had “religious” nationalism. In other words, one country’s 
nationalism is not necessarily the same as another country’s nationalism. Nationalism 
therefore begs for comparison, for larger structures sometimes impinge upon the 
actions of human agents to bring about similar ideological expressions that condition 
beliefs and behaviors, thereby constructing the sociopolitical orders of the day (van der 
Veer 2016). The works of liberal Marxist historians, such as Marshall Sahlins (1981, 
1985), for example, make this quite clear, and folklorists have been aware of it for quite 
some time, especially within and among the Finnish School, where Herbert Spencer’s 
(1876, 1896) concept of the superorganic played such a quintessential role concerning 
the movement of tales from one geographical region to another in remarkably stable 
form (e.g. Anderson 1923).  
Although I am not advocating a return to the alluring yet problematic notion of the 
superorganic (Kroeber 1917), I do wish to make a call for a return to controlled 
comparison in which the objects or phenomena compared are carefully chosen, not 
randomly assembled. Thus, I will attempt to use two examples, one culled from Europe, 
the other from Asia, to examine whether or not a meaningful comparison can be made 
of nationalisms arising out of culturally and linguistically distinct yet structurally 
similar geographical regions.2 My choice of Serbia and India has to do with the fact 
                                                   
2 Smith (1982), who argues that differences are as important as similarities in  
comparative studies, influences my thinking here, since humanistic comparison  
simply demonstrates causal similarity rather than any true relationship or scien- 
tific conclusion. Comparisons must thus be grounded not in atemporal and non- 
spatial frameworks, as phenomenologists would have it, but rather in the real  
historical and ethnographic contexts of the exempla used.  
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that religion and its by-products played an important role in creating nationalist 
ideologies that bolstered the masses to act in ways that benefitted some but 
disadvantaged others. 
In what follows, I wish to argue that there are some parallels to be made in terms of 
resource materials drawn upon by religious nationalist actors in my two case studies. 
Drawing upon a golden, mythical past, for instance, the deification of folk heroes, the 
anointing of sacred geographical sites, and the composition of epic poetry are all 
vehicles for the expression of a religious ideology constructed for nationalistic purposes 
in both contexts explored below. It is also my contention that such religious ideologies, 
once constructed, are then used to foment divisive ethnic politics that often lead to 
widespread communal violence. I conclude by suggesting that a comparative model is a 
better way to think about religious nationalism than simple isolationist analysis in 
which one single nation or culture is excised from the global context for the purpose of 




2. Comparatively Speaking 
 
 
Comparison, once the backbone of humanistic and social scientific research has been 
sidelined over the past few decades, as more culturally relativistic methods have 
proven to be more dynamic for meaningful cultural analysis. Despite this, comparison 
seems to be making a comeback, since globalization and transnationalism demand it, 
due to deterritorialization, which has led to broader frameworks for studying the 
so-called “transnation” (Appadurai 1996). Some would argue that this push for 
borderless studies is symptomatic of postmodernity, but is the current age in which we 
are living so utterly different from the age of colonialism in which nationalist 
ideologies were being formulated in Europe? Indeed, calls for walls and fences are 
resurfacing in both Europe and North America as a result of deterritorialization, which 
forces us to take a fresh, new look at the contours of the nation. As a resurgence of 
nationalism takes place in many locations, might we not want to rethink how we study 
similar phenomena in seemingly different contexts? What could be more different than 
India and Serbia? Good comparisons, I would argue, are based on significant 
differences, not just similarities (Smith 1982: 19-35). 
 
 
3. Language, Religion, and the Folk 
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When Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) wrote in his Abhandlung über den 
Ursprung der Sprache (1772) that, “language is the harmonious expression of the 
human spirit” (Cocchiara 1971: 172), he was arguing that humans needed a method for 
concretizing thought into communicative expression. But even earlier, in his 
Fragmente (1767) he argued that oral poetry was the loftiest expression of a people’s 
character. A decade later, in 1777, he wrote that Lieder (songs) embody a nation’s 
collective “beliefs, feelings, perceptions, and strengths. A small collection of such 
songs…would give us a better idea of the nations mentioned in the idle chatter of 
travelers” (Cocchiara 1971: 176-177). Now, Herder was not saying that one culture was 
superior to another, but when he merged theology with anthropology in his Ideen, his 
works fell victim to the idolization of the German nation. The voice of the people thus 
became the voice of God, and God was to be conceived of as German (Cocchiara 1971: 
181-182). Nationalism and religion are therefore strongly connected in his concept of 
das Volk. 
For Herder, the folk are not objective about their lore, since they are “traditional,” 
yet the product of their aesthetic efforts is appropriated by the “modern” nation-state 
for the purposes of unification around a single principle. Since the modern nation state 
is supposed to be secular in nature, according to Gellner and Anderson, so the 
argument used to go, religious discourse cannot be a part of nationalism. Thus, people 
who later developed Herder’s notion of the folk for nationalistic purposes in Europe 
focused more on language as a secular and aesthetic vehicle for the propagation of a 
national ideology that glorified an essential ontological core based on ethno-linguistic 
identity. In other words, the assumption was that nationalism was based on a 
secularization theory that divided the traditional as religious and the modern as 
secular. In national epics, therefore, gods become heroes. But, as is often overlooked or 
under-emphasized, martyred heroes can also become gods. The cult of the deified dead 
makes no distinction between the sacred and the profane (Blackburn 1985), but does 
serve to bolster ethno-linguistic identity for nationalistic purposes. Apotheosis 
seemingly goes against Gellner’s basic assumptions concerning the formation of 
nationalism. 
The three assumptions upon which European nationalism are based are: 1) the 
emergence of supra-local identities organized into nations, 2) the rise of authoritarian 
regimes within the public sphere that come to represent the state, and 3) specific ways 
of organizing the economy, namely by controlling the means of production and 
consumption (van der Veer 1994: 13). Using these three criteria, Gellner (1983), argues 
that growth, both social and personal, relies on homogeneity that promotes 
centralization for the purpose of achieving a standard literary culture in which all can 
participate. Such a shared culture must, by definition, be secular in nature. He also 
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argues that his teleological model of modernization is universal in nature. It has its 
origins in Europe, from where it spreads out across the globe via colonialism. One 
could also mention again that Anderson (1983) makes the same argument for print 
capitalism. Peter Berger, one of the crafters of secularization theory, more or less made 
the same claim in his Sacred Canopy (1969; see also Berger & Luckmann 1967). 
It is precisely the teleological nature of Gellner’s model that has been most heavily 
critiqued, first by Sally Falk Moore in a 1989 essay, which was then followed by van 
der Veer’s 1994 study mentioned above, where he points out that a mechanical model 
of nationalism does not allow for local variation based on a number of circumstances 
ignored by Gellner’s overgeneralized thesis. Van der Veer uses India as his example to 
demonstrate that religion is not simply erased in the process of nationalization, for the 
dichotomy between tradition and modernity simply does not apply to complex 
civilizations such as the Indic one, where tradition and modernity considerably overlap 
down to the ethnographic present to voice what Gaonkar and his associates (2001) 
refer to as “alternative modernity,” of which there are many variants among 
postcolonial countries. I shall turn my attention to India later, but let us first look at 







Like within many other Balkan cultures, nationalism emerged among Serbs as a 
result of colonialism, in this case Ottoman rule (Vjekoslav 2002). The Balkan Wars 
that contributed to the decline of the Ottoman Empire during WWI led to increasing 
Serbdom that then later re-emerged during the breakup of Yugoslavia and the 
Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. Despite the fact that Serbian nationalists merged their 
goals of autonomy with the Yugoslavists, they supported a centralized Yugoslav state 
that guaranteed the unity of the Serbian people, which was solidified in the St. Vitus 
Day (St. Vid Day) Constitution (Vivodanski ustav) of 1920. The signing of the 
document led to a consolidated, centralized state under the Serbian Karađorđević 
monarchy, which was not popular among other ethnic groups within Yugoslavia, 
especially Croatia. This led to the popular motto of “Strong Serbdom, Strong 
Yugoslavia,” but with more and more decentralization within Yugoslavia during the 
1960s under Marshal Tito (1892-1980), a resurgence of Serbdom emerged in the 1980s, 
which led to a demand for a unified Serbian state in the 1990s, as the country was 
falling apart.  
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While a whole host of factors could be identified as fueling the fire for the 
preservation and growth of Serbdom over the centuries, most scholars agree that lore 
surrounding a medieval event known as the1389 Battle of Kosovo was mythicized over 
time through hagiography, literary creations, and oral tradition, much in the same way 
as a medieval event in Ayodhya became memorialized in India, as we shall see. It was 
the event that occurred on Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day) where it is purported that the 
Serbian Prince Lazar sacrificed the kingdom of earth for the kingdom of heaven. The 
battle culminated in a number of Serbian uprisings against their Ottoman rulers that 
began in 1804. It thus came to be perceived as the decisive battle for Serbian 
independence against the Ottoman Turks or a holy battle between Christians and 
Muslims. Coincidentally, it was a Serbian linguist who, like Herder, came to glorify his 
own folk through the collection of oral epic lore that would memorialize and even 
mythicize the Battle of Kosovo (Pavlović 2009).  
Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (1787-1864), to cite just one example, collected hundreds of 
epic songs in his multi-volume Srpske narodne pjesme, first published in Vienna 
between 1841 and 1862, among which was the so-called Kosovo cycle, acknowledged by 
most scholars as being central to the entire Serbian oral tradition, since it lays out in 
heroic detail the divine battle that is central to Serbian national identity even today. 
Meanwhile, in India another narrative of nationalism emerged at roughly the same 






Although the period of colonialism in India is normally identified with the British 
Raj, an earlier wave of colonialism began with the establishment of the Mughal 
Empire. This feat was accomplished by a Central Asian Turk named Zahir ud-Din 
Muhammad Babur (d. 1530), whose reign only lasted four years, but whose empire 
lasted for more than three centuries until the British Raj defeated it in 1857. It is said 
that Babur tore down a temple in Ayodhya, the mythical birthplace of the epic hero 
Ram, and replaced it with a masjid (mosque) in 1527. Like the Battle of Kosovo, the 
controversy over the Babri Masjid had its origins in medieval disputes between two 
religious groups, in this case, the Muslim colonizers and the Hindu colonized. In both 
narratives, Muslims are the antagonists and the colonized are the warriors of virtue 
who battle for a holy land ideologically constructed out of epic narratives. More will be 
said about this last point in my conclusion, but first we must delve into the beginnings 
of religious nationalism in India. 
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Hindu rāṣtravāda (nationalism) began in the 19th century with the reform 
movements that were spearheaded by the so-called Bengal Renaissance, and 
associated with figures like Brahmo Samaj founder Ram Mohan Roy, and Arya Samaj 
founder Dayanand Saraswati. It gained its greatest momentum during the 
Independence Movement in the 20th century, however, during which cultural and 
political movements converged into a potent form of religious nationalism with the 
emergence of the Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Vishva Hindu 
Parishad (VHP), organizations that are vital and very active in Indian politics today 
(Jaffrelot 1998).3  
The term most associated with Hindu rāṣtravāda is hindutva, coined in a pamphlet 
penned by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in 1922, which means Hinduness. Hinduness 
largely excluded and discriminated against religious minorities, especially Muslims. 
Savarkar’s colleague Syama Prasad Mookerjee founded the nationalist Bharatiya Jana 
Sangh (BJS), from which emerged the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the current 
ruling party in India, both of which advocate hindutva, the idea that India should be 
the place for the protection of Hindu people and their culture. It emphasized that social, 
cultural, and political institutions should be based on Hindu thought and practice, and 
to achieve this a return to the golden age of rām rājya, the righteous rule of Ram, 
based on Hindu dharma (duty) was absolutely necessary. In other words, hindutva 
ideology called for a new nation, a Hindu rāṣtra free from the influences of outsiders. 
The nationalist “family” (parivār) of organizations just discussed evolved as a 
counterforce against the Congress party that had ruled India for much of its existence 
since Independence in 1947. It gained ascendancy largely as a result of an event that 
occurred in the 1990s, around the same time that Yugoslavia was falling apart. I turn 
to that event now, then move on to consider comparable events in the former 
Yugoslavia. The event in question is the destruction of the aforementioned Babri 
Masjid in December of 1992. The BJP took measures to memorialize the incidents 
surrounding the destruction of the mosque by Hindu right-wing nationalists, which 
left many dead, both Hindu and Muslim. It is to this tragic event that I now turn 
before returning to Serbia. 
 
 
6. The Babri Masjid Incident 
 
                                                   
3 It is important to point out, however, that the RSS was never a political party.
 Instead, it was conceived as a cultural organization, which allowed it to work 
within other political parties, even within the Congress party. Its attitudes thus 
often oscillated from one position to another, in many cases advocating paramili-t
ary activity, while in others siding with the British. See, for example, Islam (201
7). 
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The Babri Masjid in Ayodhya was built in 1528 by the first Mughal emperor named 
Babur. Fifty years later a Hindu poet named Tulsidas began composing a Hindi 
devotional text called the Ramcharitmanas (a popular vernacular version of the 
Sanskrit epic Ramayana), resulting in the growth of Ram bhakti (devotionalism) 
throughout the region, including the construction of many Ram temples in Ayodhya, 
with many claiming the town to be the birthplace of the hero-god (Lutgendorf 1991).  
According to some analysts, which Anand Patwardhan (1991) has brilliantly 
captured on film, the nineteenth century saw growing Hindu/Muslim unity that posed 
a threat to the ruling British Empire. The British Raj thus gave sanction to a rumor 
about Babur destroying a Hindu temple to build his mosque. Then, in 1949, militant 
Hindus broke into the mosque and installed a rām mūrti (Ram statue) in the mosque. 
The District Magistrate K.K. Nayar refused to remove the image, claiming communal 
discord, and the mosque was subsequently sealed off until the matter could be 
adjudicated in the court system, which has still not happened to this very day.4 On 
December 23, 1949 a personal account disseminated concerning someone’s vision of a 
boy Ram (4-5 years old) who appeared in the mosque in a great flash of light, at which 
time the lock on the precinct’s gate miraculously broke off. In more recent times, a 
concerted video campaign telling of the miraculous appearance of the boy Ram was 
propagated to bolster support for the VHP (World Hindu Society) and the Ram 
Janambhoomi (Ram Birth Ground) cause.  
Muslims have not been able to pray at the site since then, although Hindus 
continued to worship outside of the Babri gate with the help of a local pūjārī (ritual 
specialist). It was with this contentious history in mind that L. K. Advani, then head of 
the BJP (Indian People’s Party), vowed to undertake a rathyātrā (chariot pilgrimage) 
throughout India to rally Hindu kar sevaks (volunteers) to proceed to Ayodhya for the 
purpose of tearing down the mosque to build a temple to Ram on that very spot, where 
many devout Hindus now felt was his exact birth place. October 30, 1990 was the 
predetermined date set for Advani’s arrival in Ayodhya after the rathyātrā passed 
through many states in northern India, causing violence all along the way, during 
which thousands died or were seriously injured.  
The VHP, the international cultural arm of the BJP, was called upon to rally the 
faithful throughout the world to send money and bricks to support the building of the 
temple. Once the so-called “pilgrimage” (yātrā) began, violence and death occurred at 
virtually every stop along the way, and despite the fact that Advani was arrested at 
one point but then released, they managed to stay on schedule to reach Ayodhya in 
conjunction with a real Hindu pilgrimage called the pañcakrośī yātrā, the 
                                                   
4 At the same time, Hindu agitation in Ayodhya increasingly continues to pressure the 
government to build the temple without delay. 
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circumambulation of the holy precincts. This “coincidence” was, in fact, planned, so 
that the police would not be able to distinguish between pilgrims (yātrī) and kar sevaks, 
the so-called “volunteers” rallying around Advani to tear down the mosque. Thus, the 
volunteers were able to enter the sealed off area around the mosque. They were, 
however, unsuccessful in destroying it on that occasion, but the mosque was finally 
brought down brick by brick by Hindu mobs led by radical sādhus (Hindu mendicants) 
a few years later on December 6, 1992.  
Advani went on to become the successful home minister of India during the first BJP 
period of rule. He was much later exonerated of all charges concerning incitement of 
religious intolerance and communal violence. The BJP rules India today under the 
guidance of the prime minister named Narendra Modi, who himself was a member of 
the RSS in his youth, and continues to sympathize with the organization in the present. 
During his earlier rule as chief minister of Gujarat pogroms against Muslims occurred 
as well, but with his rise to national power he, too, was absolved of any wrongdoing in 
his home state, despite earlier accusations, which even prevented him from receiving a 
visa to enter the United States. While all of this communal violence was fomenting in 
India during the 1990s, Yugoslavia was falling apart, due to civil war and a revival of 
latent Serbian nationalism that took on religious undertones. 
 
 
7. Pre- and Modern Serbian Nationalism 
 
 
As Branimir Anzulovic (1999) has noted, the Eastern Orthodox Christian countries 
of Europe developed differently from the Christian and Protestant ones, which 
resulted in the Serbian Orthodox Church having strong ideological ties with the nation 
well into the eighteenth century. But even as Serbs started establishing ties with 
Western Europe from then on, the Serbian Orthodox Church continued to exert 
influence on Serbian culture, as did an older tribal ethos, in which primordial 
mythology was used ideologically to resurrect pre-Christian hero cults. This, coupled 
with romantic ideas borrowed from Western Europe about vernacular language and 
folk art as the purest expressions of the nation’s soul, served as the platform for the 
establishment of a “greater Serbia.” 
The Pagan revival drew inspiration from nineteenth century Serbian historiography 
and oral tradition about the contested cataclysmic exodus in 1690 from the Pannonian 
plain, called the Great Migration, the consequence of which was transforming Kosovo 
from a purely Serbian place to one occupied by Albanians. It also pushed the Serb 
Patriarch Arsenije, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, north to Karlovci in 1713, 
bringing him into direct contact with the Hapsburgs in Vienna. As a result, the 
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Hapsburgs gave the Serbian Church a status similar to that they had under the 
Ottomans, which resulted in a higher degree of political autonomy among Serbians 
than the Roman Catholic Church had over Catholics.  
It was during the Arsenije Patriarchy period that Enlightenment thinking from the 
West influenced such people as Dositej Obradović (1739-1811), who pushed for stronger 
ties to the West by discouraging elements of Serbian culture that had nationalist 
overtones, such as Pagan survivals and folk poetry emulating heroes who died violent 
deaths defending Serbia. Others, such as the aforementioned Vuk Karadžić, followed 
the nationalist Vladika Petar Petrović Njegoš (1813-1851), whose dramatic poem 
Gorski vijenac (“Mountain Wreath,” 1847) utilized religious symbolism to glorify the 
special nature of being Serbian by setting them up as the saviors of Europe who could 
expel the Turks, or die trying. These Romanticists, who were in opposition to the 
rationalists, were the ones responsible for reviving Pagan imagery and tribal ethos in 
modern Serbian literature. Their dedication to folk culture eventually swayed even the 
liberal Obradović. Later in his life he began collecting folk art and writing modern 
“folk” poetry in the Serbian vernacular, much in the same way that Rabindranath 
Tagore and Gurusaday Dutt did in India to instill a sense of vernacular nationalism 
among the urban intelligentsia.5  
A central character that received increasing mention during this battle between 
rationalism and romanticism was Saint Sava (aka Stari Ras, d. January 12, 1236), who 
provided a bridge between the church, state, and nation beginning in 1219. Saint Sava, 
also known as The Enlightener, was a Serbian prince and Orthodox monk, the first 
Archbishop of the Serbian Church and the purported founder of Serbia law, thereby 
merging religion and the state, as Serbia became more autonomous (Anzulovic 1999: 
23-24).  In many respects, Saint Sava marks the beginning of classical Serbian history, 
while Obradović does the transition to the modern period. At first, these two figures 
may seem antithetical: Saint Sava was looking inward for a Serbian essence based on 
religion, while Obradović was outward looking, based on a western notion of a 
linguistically united nation state that was secular in nature. These two streams, 
however, would converge to create a modern form of religious nationalism. In fact, it 
was Obradović who introduced pan-Serbianism in 1783, when he coined the term 
                                                   
5 By invoking Tagore’s name here, I do not wish to suggest that he was in any 
way an advocate of hindutva, but rather to point out that he was inspired to  
use folklore (lok sāhitya) in a way similar to Serbian folklorists, which is to say,
as a vehicle to rally nationalists to act for the cause of independence, even if it 
meant fabricating the lore itself. Similarly, Gurusday Dutt did the same, based  
on ethnic and cultural distinctness (see Korom 2006, 2010). The main difference 
is that Tagore and Dutt did not advocate a separate Bengali state apart from  
India, whereas Serbs did. This is why I refer to it as “vernacular” nationalism  
in the Indian context, regional nationalism within a multicultural nation state.  
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“Slavoserbian” to refer to all of the areas that would become part of Yugoslavia, a 
united Slavia. In his Mezimac (1818), he wrote the following: 
 
The Serbs are called differently in different kingdoms and provinces: in Serbia, 
Serbians, …in Bosnia, Bosnians, in Dalmatia, Dalmatians, in Herzegovina, 
Herzegovinians, in Montenegro, Montenegrins. …The most ordinary Serb from 
Banat or Bačka finds in Serbia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Dalmatia, 
especially in Croatia, in Slovenia and Strem, his own native language and his 
people, whether they be of Eastern or Roman faith (Anzulovic 1999: 73). 
 
The tension that divided the Romanticists and the Rationalists, however, continued 
to be religious in nature. Dositej advocated secularism, but Njegoš à la Saint Sava 
advocated the elimination of other religions, since they were deemed to be the dividing 
factor of a united and greater Serbia. This clearly echoes Savarkar’s message in 
Hindutva, where he advocates a Hindu state based on the eradication of foreigners (i.e., 
Muslims). It was this conflict of the mythical and the rational that the historian 
Anzulovic (1999) sees as the spark that erupted into the conflagration that led to 
Yugoslavia’s demise after the death of Tito.  
 
 
8. A Folkloric Interlude 
 
 
Before moving on to the nineties, a few words about Vuk Karadžić are in order, since 
it was he who really propagated the linguistic theory of Pan-Serbianism adumbrated 
by Obradović. Karadžić , though Montenegrin by birth, argued that all Štokavian 
dialects were Serbian (minus Čakavian dialects spoken in the Dalmatian islands, and 
Magyar, spoken in Banat and Bačka). Since all the linguistic groups that became part 
of Yugoslavia spoke these dialects, it was natural that they should form one nation. His 
position received the approval of German Romanticists, among them Jakob Grimm 
(1785-1863), who advised Karadžić on collecting folklore, which resulted in his 
magnum opus, the four-volume Srpske narodne pjesme (Serbian Folk Songs).  
Karadžić’s language/nation equation brought him into conflict with the Serbian 
Church, however, which equated religion with nation. But this conflict eventually 
subsided, since virtually all of the Štokavian speaking peoples fell under the Patriarch 
of Peć. The Church thus decided that it could continue to wield political power, so long 
as the majority of the people were under its religious jurisdiction. The problem was, 
however, that the imagined Serb people were split between those in the south who 
were ruled by the Ottomans and those in the north who were under the house of the 
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Hapsburgs, so while the northerners engaged in interacting with the Christian west, 
the southerners were more involved with attempts at liberation from the Muslim east.  
It was during the period before WWI that the Serbian intelligentsia revived the 
Pagan solar deity Vid, who was a South Slavic war god, glorified in folk song as the 
defeater of Turks and Magyars. Vid was defeated with the advent of Christendom, just 
like Prince Lazarus was defeated in the Battle of Kosovo with the advent of the Muslim 
Turks, in both cases leading to the destruction of the Serbian state. Thus, the Battle of 
Kosovo mentioned earlier comes to be associated in folk tradition with the defeat of 
Paganism by Christianity. Later, Prince Lazarus, the loser at Kosovo becomes 
sanctified and associated with Saint Sava, both of whom become surreptitiously 
associated with Vid, since Vid’s Day, the summer solstice, is also the day when the 
battle for Kosovo occurred. But because Vid was a Pagan god, the Serbian Church 
obviously did not celebrate him at first. However, religious authorities cleverly 
replaced him with the Biblical prophet Amos and the canonized Saint Lazarus as the 
object of reverence on that occasion. 
The mythical associations above were propagated not by the perceived “folk,” such as 
the rural peasantry of the Dinaric highlands who were identified with the Pagan-tribal 
ethos that originally worshipped Vid, but by the urban intelligentsia that harbored the 
patriotic myth of a greater Serbia, much in the same way that urban nationalists, such 
as Tagore and Dutt imagined the folk at roughly the same time in India (Korom 2006, 
2010). As Anzulovic points out, Vid’s Day first appears on Serbian calendars in the 
1860s, the “time of the triumph of Vuk Karadžić’s ideas and nationalist exuberance 
caused by progressive liberation from Turkish rule” (1999: 83-84), but becomes 
recognized as a church, national, and folk holiday in 1913, the year the Turks were 
defeated during the First Balkan War. On the same day the following year, a Serbian 
nationalist ignited WWI by assassinating the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to 
the Austro-Hungarian throne.  
 
 
9. Returning to “Greater Serbia” 
 
 
A number of other significant and symbolic events are associated with Vid’s day, 
including a 1989 speech by Slobodan Milošević in Kosovo to celebrate the 600th 
anniversary of the famed battle infamously known as the Gazimestan Speech, in which 
he vowed to use arms to keep the Serbian people united. It should also be noted that 
just weeks prior to his speech, Lazar’s remains were processed around Serb populated 
areas of Yugoslavia, where the relics were met by large groups of Serbian nationalists.     
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Milošević himself then moved around the fragmenting country on a political 
pilgrimage, much like Advani’s rathyātrā in India, to trace the holy land known as 
Heavenly Serbia. This idea can be traced back to Saint Sava, who was convinced that 
the Serbian nation was chosen and holy because of its identity with one faith. From 
this perspective, there is no difference between the transcendental Serbia and the 
existential one. Myth and history thus blended together for the purposes of Serbian 
nationalism, which François Mitterand referred to as Serbian “imperialism” during his 
visit to Sarajevo on Vid’s Day in 1992.  The resurrection of a Dinaric Pagan heroic 
ethos associated with the cult of Vid had become part of the patriotic spirit of the Serbs, 
as Yugoslavia was breaking apart to the point that even the Serbian Orthodox Church 
accepted it, despite apologetics that would later emerge (Dobrijevic 2001; Vukomanović 
1999).  
In both India and Serbia, then, heroic epics and movement across sacred landscapes 
by politicians emulating heroic figures to rally the nationalist masses played out, each 
with tragic consequences. In India it led to the destruction of a minority religious place 
of worship that was an archaeological monument and to the further deterioration of 
Hindu-Muslim relationships. In the former Yugoslavia, it led to the destruction of an 
entire nation, including genocide committed against Muslims during civil war there. In 
both cases, religious nationalism targeting the Muslim Other, fomented extreme 
violence for the purposes of political ascendancy based on religious identity just as 






Having provided a summary of two series of events separated spatially by over three 
thousand miles, let me conclude with a few brief observations. Although India and 
Serbia are very specific places with their own unique histories, their differences invite 
comparison on the question of religious nationalism. To begin with, both countries were 
colonized by alien others who practiced different religions. As a result, these others 
became demonized as antagonists in mythic epics that were composed to elevate 
certain heroes to the status of divine king and to advocate a utopian golden age. For 
India this was the era of the rule of Ram during the mythical satya yuga, the age of 
truth. For Serbs it was the brief reign of Petar I, which ran just from 1903-1914 
(Anzulovic 1999: 89). In both places, the golden age is connected to a sacred place, so 
that Ayodhya takes on cosmic meaning for Hindus and Kosovo does the same for Serbs.  
In both instances, medieval events triggered a long period of fomentation that 
resulted in the revival of militant nationalism in the pre- and modern period, 
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especially in postcolonial times. Tulsidas wrote the Ramcharitmanas to elevate the 
hero Ram to divine status, while guslars, the oral poets later studied by Albert Lord 
(1960), made the hero Lazar into a saint. Modern intellectuals who were also amateur 
folklorists, such as Rabindranath Tagore in India and Vuk Karadžić in Serbia, revived 
such hagiographies in their respective attempts to bolster the idea of building a 
vernacular culture based on a monolingual theory of nationhood as part of a freedom 
struggle. For Tagore it was Bengali, for Karadžić it was Serbian. Advani and Milošević 
continued this pattern in postcolonial times by mimicking divine heroes to bolster 
religious nationalism. 
Regional narratives that became national myths developed over several centuries, 
but they were then appropriated and revived in the 1990s. Contemporary politicians 
used the same heroic narratives of Ram and Lazar respectively to rally militants based 
on misguided religious sentiment. In both cases, the revitalization of national myths 
concerning sacred ground, tinged with ideas about “chosen people,” led to the 
demonization of religious others. In the final analysis, it cannot be denied that it was 
religion that served as a purportedly unifying principle. In India, Advani called for all 
Hindus to unite against Muslims, while Milošević called on all Serbian Orthodox 
Christians to unite against Roman Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosniaks. The big 
difference, however, is the issue of scale. After all, the Babri Masjid affair did not bring 
about civil war and the destruction of an entire country in India, whereas in 
Yugoslavia, the nation could not be saved. However, what characterizes both, albeit on 
noticeably different scales, was violence instigated against an alien Other blamed for 
the subjugation of a majority group that was linguistically and religiously different 
from the subjugator, or at least perceived to be.6 
The ultimate lesson to be learned here is that the secularization thesis advocated in 
the 1960s proved wrong. Berger, himself, one of the most important crafters of 
secularization theory in the sixties, even recanted his theory in 1999 with the 
publication of The Desecularization of the World, in which he argued that grand 
dichotomies between east and west do not often work. Indeed, in the two case studies 
analyzed here, one “eastern,” one “western,” I would argue that much can be gained by 
                                                   
6 Interestingly, the linguistic distinction between Hindi-Urdu and Serbo-Croatian 
are based on virtually the same components. Both hyphenations are essentially  
the same languages from a formal, grammatical perspective, but they use scripts
associated with different religions. Hence, Hindi is written in Devanagari script 
and associated with Hinduism, while Urdu is written in a modified Perso-Arabic
script and associated with Muslims. Similarly, Serbian is written in Cyrillic and 
associated with Eastern Orthodoxy, while Croatian is written in Latin script and
associated with Catholics. It has been religious affiliation that has separated the
two in post-conflict times. Urdu, now the official language of Pakistan must be  
seen as different from Hindi, the lingua franca of India, just as Serbian must be
seen as different from Croatian in order to distinguish independent nations from
each other. 
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looking comparatively at countries as dissimilar as India and Serbia, where the uses 
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